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JURY TRIALS AND FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES IN
"CYBER WORLD"*
John E. Nowak**
Is THERE ANYTHING LEFT TO SAY?
In the past half-century, I suspect, enough trees to constitute a
small forest have been turned into paper simply for discussion of
free speech and fair trial issues. I doubt that there is little new to
say about how legislatures or courts should be dealing with the
subject at the moment. The Supreme Court has been able to work
out a series of positions that are at least "good enough for gov-
ermnent work" concerning subjects such as attorney speech
regulations, closure of trials, courthouse picketing, and protective
orders related to the discovery process.
Of course, to maintain friendships with persons who planned
and participated in the Allen Chair Symposium, I concede that
there is great academic merit in the continuing debate regarding
the Court's current positions on these issues. Nevertheless, I'm
convinced that all persons who debate such issues in terms of
1990s technology are like the proverbial generals who devise mili-
tary plans that are only good if they are going to fight the last
war.
Why, you ask, did I agree to speak at the Allen Chair Sympo-
sium and, later, to contribute an article to this law review issue?
Copyright 2000, by John E. Nowak.
David C. Baum Professor of Law, University of Illinois. My colleagues Jay Kesan,
Peter Maggs, Lynn Branham, Kit Kinports, Wayne LaFave, and Ronald Rotunda provided
great help to me in finding many of the reference materials that are cited in this article. I
am especially indebted to William Mischo, Director of the Grainger Library of the College
of Engineering and Professor of Library Administration, for his help in teaching me how to
get started in doing research into many of the technical points that are mentioned in this
article. I profited greatly from my discussions with faculty and students of the University
of Richmond School of Law at the Allen Chair Symposium.
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Good question. The answer is that in the next half-century
changes in the distribution of information through cyber systems'
will make most, if not all, of the last fifty years of debate over the
free press versus fair trial issues (in ascending order of rudeness)
quaint, irrelevant, or useless.2
The Justices were able to develop standards for litigation re-
lated speech that protect both First Amendment and due process
values in the twentieth century due, at least in part, to the fact
that the ways in which the public received information regarding
legal issues, in general, and trial, in particular, changed slowly
between the middle of the century and the early 1990s. Cable and
satellite TV (including the Court TV station) are simply exten-
sions of the mass communication revolution that started with ra-
dio and broadcast television. A small, though rapidly growing,
percentage of the population own computers, but the Internet and
World Wide Web are not main sources of local or national news
for the majority of our country. Perhaps unfortunately, the age of
slow-paced changes in information delivery technology is at an
end. Courts will need to modify constitutional doctrines to keep
up with the impact of twenty-first century information systems
on the adjudicative process.
In this article, I will put forth several proposals for how current
Supreme Court doctrines should change by mid-century in order
to deal with developments in information transmission technol-
ogy. What many of my listeners in Richmond found and most of
1. I am going to use the term cyber systems to describe all information transfer and
storage systems that involve what we now think of as digital or computerized information
systems. I may well be using the word improperly, but any attempt to be more precise, at
least by me, may be useless. The use of quantum theory to create new cyber systems may
make all of today's terminology about computers, e-mail, Internet and the World Wide
Web useless or, at least, out-of-date in the near future. See Andrew M. Steane & Eleanor
G. Rieffel, Beyond Bits: The Future of Quantum Information Processing, COMPUTER, Jan.
2000, at 38.
For a non-geek friendly examination (actually a book that corresponds with a
Public Broadcasting Series) of the start of the systems we now refer to as the Internet and
World Wide Web, see STEPHEN SEGALLER, NERDS 2.0.1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
INTERNET (1998) [hereinafter NERDS].
2. It was over thirty years ago that the American Bar Association first attempted to
set out a framework for these issues. See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL
AND FREE PRESS (1968).
Of course, my coauthor and I have set out the best summary of the current First
Amendment rules in our single and multi-volume treatises. See JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 16 (6th ed. 2000); RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NoWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw ch. 20 (3d ed. 1999). For reference
work that is almost as good as ours, see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1999).
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my readers will find shocking are my conclusions as to how those
doctrines should be modified. Here are my three proposals,
ranked in order of the shock value, and in reverse order of their
appearance in this article. First, all knowledge of potential jurors
that is gained through cyber sources (such as information gained
from a person connecting with an attorney's Web site or through
any service that tracks a potential juror's past activities in cyber-
space) must be made available to the opposing party in both civil
and criminal cases. Second, trial judges should be given much
greater power than they have under current Supreme Court rul-
ings to close parts of pretrial proceedings or civil trials and to
prohibit dissemination of information concerning the closed por-
tions of trials. Third, trial judges should be given far greater pow-
ers to issue protective orders regarding material disclosed during
the discovery process; there should be absolute civil liability for
any attorney or party who violates a discovery order. In what
should be a noncontroversial part of the article, I will advocate a
step-by-step approach to revision of court decisions and rules re-
garding the ability of attorneys to disseminate information via
cyber systems.
ALEXANDER BICKEL AND FLYING CARS
In Richmond, my predictions concerning the technological in-
novations that would drastically change free speech-fair trial
problems were greeted with complete disbelief. Concerns about
members of a potential jury pool receiving significant amounts of
information via cyber systems were greeted with statements such
as: "No one will read all those e-messages you are worried about;
I can't get through my e-mail now;" "people will always rely on
traditional news media, or their Web sites, for information about
trials;" "parties won't have time to identify the Internet activities
of potential jurors;" and "opposing parties couldn't have enough
time for review of all the documents they might be given con-
cerning potential jurors."
Once I sat down to put my ideas in writing, I realized that I
should have been ready for what Alexander Bickel referred to as
"remembering the future."3 We do, indeed, remember, rather thanimagine, the future. A person's imagination has to be based on
the data he knows. For hundreds, if not thousands, of years, per-
sons imagined airplanes and helicopters, for they could see crea-
3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS ch. 4
(1970).
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tures that flew and leaves that came down from trees in a slow,
circular pattern. No one envisioned radio or television, several
hundred years ago, because they did not know of the radio waves
that would make such "imagination" possible. Remembering the
future is not a fault in the thought processes of prior civilizations.
Only thirty years ago, AT&T turned down the opportunity to own
what we now call the Internet, because persons at AT&T thought
that packet switching would not work on a large scale.4
An IBM software commercial, which began airing on television
in the summer of 2000, has a spokesman who says that, when he
was young, he was told that there would be flying cars in the year
2000. He then asks: "Where are the flying cars?" Those persons
who think about future free press-fair trial issues in terms of a
speeding up of, but not a dramatic change in, cyber systems are
like the grade school teachers in the 1950s who told me that there
would be flying cars in the year 2000.
Since I have talked about the future, a few words about the
past are in order. I do not want to enter the never-ending debate
concerning searches for original intent.5 I must confess, however,
that I really do not care about the "original intent" of drafters of
the First Amendment concerning technological issues. I would not
claim that the history of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
are irrelevant to solving tomorrow's problems. Rather, I believe
that such history is only good for informing us about the values
our society has sought to protect over time. Any person who
claims that the "original intent" of "The Framers" provides clear
answers to the First and Fourteenth Amendment issues that
arise with new information delivery technology will be imagining
the past, by attributing his views to the views of persons long
dead.
In this article I will make an assumption about our society's
values in the future, and several assumptions of a technical na-
ture. All of my assumptions are really predictions about the fu-
ture. I call these predictions "assumptions" because they are the
basis for my positions about how the legal doctrines will have to
change in the next half-century.
My value assumption is that, as a nation, we will continue to
want a jury system in which we have jurors who know little or
4. NERDS, supra note 1, at 72, 74, 108-09.
5. I have stated my views on this topic in other places. E.g., John E. Nowak, The
"Sixty Something" Anniversary of the Bill of Rights, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 445-46
(1992).
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nothing about the incident that is the subject of litigation, and
who are not prejudiced against any of the parties. I have no way
of justifying this assumption except to ask my reader to reflect on
the public concern over the outcomes of certain trials (especially
in California and New York) that have been held before a jury
that was predominantly of one race.
We have never had truly neutral juries in "truly sensational
cases." The facts of a truly sensational case dominate the local or
national media. Virtually all of the persons called as potential ju-
rors in the truly sensational case will have gained a significant
amount of knowledge (which may or may not be correct) about the
issues and parties in the case. In all likelihood, these persons may
well have come to some judgment about the case. Nevertheless, in
such cases we pretend that the voir dire process, and information
produced by jury questioners of the type endorsed by the ABA's
Standards for Criminal Justice,6 will produce a neutral jury, be-
cause we have no alternative.
6. STANDARDS FOR CRIINAL JUSTICE Standards 15-2.2, 15-2.4 (3d ed. 1996).
The text of Standard 15-2.2 (Juror questionnaires) provides:
(a) Basic questionnaire
Before voir dire examination begins, the court and counsel should be provided
with data pertinent to the qualifications of the prospective jurors and to mat-
ters ordinarily raised in voir dire examination.
(1) The questionnaire should include information about the juror's
name, sex, age, residence, marital status, education level, occupation
and occupation history, employment address, previous service as a ju-
ror, and present or past involvement as a party to civil or criminal liti-
gation.
(2) Such data should be obtained from prospective jurors by means of
a questionnaire furnished to the prospective jurors wvith the jury sum-
mons, and to be returned by the prospective jurors before the time of
jury selection.
(b) Specialized questionnaire
In appropriate cases, the court, with the assistance of counsel, should prepare
a specialized questionnaire addressing particular issues that may arise.
(1) The questionnaire should be specific enough to provide appropri-
ate information for utilization by counsel, but not be unnecessarily
embarrassing or overly intrusive.
(2) If questionnaires are made available to counsel prior to the day of
the voir dire, the identity of the jurors may be protected by removing
identifying information from the questionnaires.
(c) All questionnaires should be prepared and supervised by the court.
(1) The jurors should be advised of the purpose of the questionnaire,
how it will be used and who will have access to the information.
(2) All questionnaires should be provided to counsel in sufficient time
before the start of voir dire to enable counsel to adequately review
them before the start of voir dire.
Id. Standard 15-2.2.
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A half-century from now, if the Supreme Court does not revise
some of its First Amendment rulings, we will have to make unre-
alistic assumptions about jury neutrality for many non-
sensational cases. My technical assumptions about the future
lead me to believe that a significant number of potential jurors
(who are receiving their news through a wide variety of cyber
sources, and who are attending meetings of associations that ex-
ist only in cyberspace) will feel relatively safe in omitting facts
about their sources of information and associations. When that
time comes, we will have no reason to believe that we have neu-
tral, unbiased juries in any case that is mentioned in e-mails or
Web sites.
If we come to the position as a society that we do not care
whether juries are neutral, and we are willing to tolerate deci-
sions based on juror biases, then there will be no reason to revisit
First Amendment doctrines or privacy concepts. This article is
built upon the assumption that our society will not abandon the
desire for a neutral jury system. I make this assumption because
I believe that a refinement of certain First Amendment principles
will seem to be a smaller price to pay for us as a society than
would be the abandonment of our current jury system.
The technical assumptions I will use in this article are fairly
safe predictions about technological developments that will occur
by the year 2050. Most, if not all, of these technological develop-
ments may come about in the next ten or twenty years.
My first assumption is that someone will develop "smart"
search engines, which are sometimes called spiders (because they
crawl the Web). These smart searchers will allow the average
person to better find information that exists in cyberspace than
can be done through current "dumb" search engines. Today, an
individual who uses several search engines (such as Yahoo-
Google, Go, Excite, and the like) will be searching only a portion
of the Web. A smart search engine would search the entire Web,
in a logical progression based on the contents of Web sites, to
identify all information the user desires. Sufficient work has been
done on the development of smart search engines, otherwise
known as intelligent spiders, so that this prediction may become
reality shortly after this article is published.'
7. E.g., Hsinchun Chen et al., Intelligent Spider for Internet Searching, 30 PROC.
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After, if not simultaneously with, the development of smart
search engines, there will be "smart sorters," which is the term I
use for a computer system that can separate incoming messages
(what we now think of as e-mail) by the content of the message.
Smart sorters, like smart spiders, will be at work in the user's
computer without the user being present.
If smart searches and sorters exist, mass mailings from attor-
neys, businesses, and parties to litigation will be much more ef-
fective than they are now. At the present time, I hope and trust,
most people throw out mass mailings (junk mail) that come to
them via the U.S. mail (snail mail). I doubt that mass e-mailers
do better than mass junk mailers. If a law firm, or other business,
wants to reach a lot of people via a mass e-mail, it is currently
limited to relying on one of the companies that tracks or profiles
cyber activities of persons using the Internet or Web.' With such
information the attorney or business can send mass e-mail mes-
sages to a target audience. Unfortunately for the mass e-mailer, e-
mail receivers allow the target recipients to delete messages
based on the identity of the sender, or the topic line of the mes-
sage, without examining the full contents of the message. As a
member of my Richmond audience said: "not many people are
going to open a lot of e-mail from unknown sources, be they at-
torneys or other businesses." Businesses who are sending out the
HAW. INT'L CONF. ON SYS. SC. 178, 179 (1997); Christopher C. Yang et al., Intelligent
Internet Searching Engine Based on Hybrid Simulated Annealing, 31 PROC. HAW. INT'L
CONF. ON SYS. Sci. 415, 416 (1998); Richard Kilmer, As We May Think-Revisited,
INTERNET COMPUTING (Jan.-Feb. 2000), at http://computer.orgtinternet.
For some real world [money] problems in search system development, see Lucas
Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Defining the Web: The Politics of Search Engines,
COMPUTER, Jan. 2000, at 54; see also Search Engine Watch, at http'//www.searchengine
watch.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2000).
8. These services may be very good. "It may have once been true that on the Internet
no one knew you were a dog, as illustrated in an old New Yorker cartoon. But as they say
on the Web now, these days marketers probably know your favorite brand of dog food."
Josh Duberman & Michael Beaudet, Privacy Perspectives for Online Searchers: Confiden-
tiality with Confidence, SEARCHER (July-Aug. 2000), at http//-vww.infotoday.com/
searcher/julO0/duberman&beaudet.htm; see also Brian Fonesca, Blanket Insecurity?: Web
Security, Privacy Problems Raise Confidence Issues, INFOWORLD, July 10, 2000, at 1; Mar-
garet Mannix & Susan Gregory Thomas, Exposed Online: On the Web, Your Personal Life
Is Merely Marketable Data, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 23, 1997, at 59.
For excellent, brief, non-technical explanations of how user information is col-
lected on today's cyber systems, see Hope Viner Samborn, Nibbling Away at Privacy: Cook-
ies Are Lurking in Your Hard Drive, Ready to Grab Your User Data, A.B.A. J., June 2000,
at 26; David P. Hamilton, Web's Design Hinders Goals of User Privacy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3,
2000, at B1.
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junk e-mail today may have most of their messages go to receiv-
ers' deleted items folder without being read, because the receiving
computer cannot sort out the messages by the content of the mes-
sage.
In a world of smart search engines and smart sorters an indi-
vidual can tell his receiving computer that he wants to search for,
or receive, messages concerning certain topics. The search engine
would then find only cyber locations that actually include the in-
formation being sought. If the individual was receiving e-mail
from unknown sources, the sorter would identify the subject mat-
ter of the message as being in compliance, or not in compliance,
with the type of information that the receiver wished to look at or
hear. The sorter would discard the messages that did not involve
topics of interest and would keep only those that met the inter-
ests of the user. For example, in the future, an individual will be
able to set his personal computer to search for, and his sorter to
accept, information about crimes occurring within a hundred-mile
radius of his home, or information concerning automobile tires.
The spider would search for every type of cyber source that might
contain such information, regardless of the name of the Web site.
The sorter would discard messages from unknown sources (such
as law firms or businesses) unless the substance of the message
related to the user's specific topics of interest (local crimes or
tires). With a computer doing the sorting of messages, the argu-
ment that "people will never have time to look at all these e-mails
that attorneys or businesses send out" becomes quaint, at best.
My second assumption is that the increase in chip speed, and
reduction in price for computer chips, will continue at a pace
roughly equal to that of the 1980s and 1990s. In the past several
decades it was a common belief (known as Moore's Law) that
there will be a doubling of chip speed and reduction in chip price
every eighteen months. The first IBM computers took up a room.
In the 1960s and early '70s Apollo astronauts landed on the Moon
with computers in their lunar lander that had less power than
any law student's laptop. Perhaps the Moore's Law pace for chip
improvement cannot continue forever.9 Nevertheless, we should
9. What Is Moore's Law?, at http'//www.intel.com/intel/museum/25anniv/hof/moore.
htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2000); George A. Chidi, Blowing Moore's Law to Bits, Infoworld.
com, at http://wwv.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/00/08/15/000815hnquantum.xml (Aug.
15, 2000).
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see a change in the size and speed of personal computers. In an-
other half-century, if not sooner, small computers should be able
to do many of the jobs now that can only be done by today's so-
called supercomputer. °
Along with the increase in speed, and reduction in size, of com-
puters, there should be a drastic reduction in price of computers.
I do not ask my reader to believe that fifty years from now every
abode, no matter how humble, will have a small, high-tech ma-
chine that will do the work of a current supercomputer. I ask you
only to accept my assumption that almost every household will
have access to some type of computer that receives information
through cyber systems. As always, rich households will have the
best of everything, including computers. Households of lower in-
come families will have some type of computer, just as most
homes have some type of telephone today.
My third assumption is that there will be a rapidly growing
number of news sources in the next several decades. Any person
with a computer may be able to start a newsletter that actually
has real impact on the community in decades ahead. That predic-
tion would be true today, except for the words "real impact." Cre-
ating a local news Web site may be a popular activity, but most
news Web sites, other than those that are companions to tradi-
tional print or broadcast media, are unlikely to reach many per-
sons for two reasons. First, a significant percentage of households
do not have computers. All those computers being put into schools
today have nothing to do with this point. The fact that little Jane
and John have computers at school has nothing to do with
whether their parents, who may be part of a jury pool, are getting
their news through cyber systems.
Second, when searching for the news, many of today's computer
users will only hit traditional sources, such as the cyber versions
of major newspapers or the cyber sites of broadcast news media.
If a start-up neighborhood newsletter went out to everyone via
mass e-mail today, a majority of the receivers might simply delete
the message before reading it. Indeed, after receiving a couple of
"junk e-mails" from the would-be news distributor, many persons
would simply set their e-mail systems to automatically delete any
message coming from that sender.
10. Tom Sullivan, IBM Commercializes Supercomputer, Infoworld.com, at http'/www.
infoworld.com/articleshn/xml/0/O7/20/O0O720hnsuper.xml (July 20, 2000).
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If we have smart searchers and sorters, the non-traditional
purveyor of news will have a realistic chance of reaching most of
the persons who are interested in the subject matter that the new
news source contains. Many persons are interested in the safety
of their community; such persons might set their computer to look
for, and receive, messages concerning crimes within 100 miles of
their home. A smart search engine or sorter should be able to
identify only the portion of the cyber newsletters that discuss lo-
cal crime, and delete all other portions of the news source. The
receiver will easily be able to read or hear the discussion of crime
contained in all of the variety of cyber newsletters and cyber
mailings. Everyone who sends out cyber messages containing in-
formation about such local crime would have a real chance of get-
ting their message to such persons.
In the future, an individual who is called as a juror will be able
to say that he or she has never read or learned about a case, with
some confidence that he or she will not be caught in a lie. When a
person had to get information from newspapers, radio, or televi-
sion, tripping up a juror who lied about whether he knew the
facts of a dispute would be fairly easy for a good attorney during
the voir dire process. When there are an unlimited number of
news sources, a juror with a bias towards one of the parties, or a
specific opinion concerning the case, will feel relatively safe in
lying about the amount of his knowledge and opinions.
In the good (or bad-your choice) old days, being a member of
an unpopular association might require you to physically go to
meetings and to receive tangible documents. These activities
would increase the likelihood that your "friends and neighbors"
would know that you are a member of the unpopular organiza-
tion. The increasing speed, efficiency, and availability of comput-
ers in future decades should result in an increasing number of
"cyber associations," by which I mean groups that rarely, if ever,
have physical meetings. These associations will have real time
group meetings, without having to use chat room or bulletin
board technology. For unpopular associations this will be a great
world, so long as the government is prohibited from monitoring
such activities.11
11. See generally D. Ian Hopper, Agencies Track Online Visitors Despite Rule, WASH.
POST, Oct. 22, 2000, at A13, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/vp-dyn/articles/
A55051-2000Oct.21.html. Beware, the "carnivore" program may be swallowing lots of in-
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The development of cyber associations may seem like a great
First Amendment advancement, because persons will have less
fear than ever before that the public will know about their asso-
ciation with unpopular persons or beliefs. On the other hand, an
age of cyber associations, with no change in our view concerning
how juries are formed, would be a disaster for the jury process. At
the moment, if a potential juror (on a jury questionnaire or in voir
dire) lies about his association with communist, fascist, militia, or
racist organizations, the potential juror raises a serious risk of a
contempt citation, if not a peijury conviction. When these associa-
tions exist only in cyberspace, a potential juror may feel safe in
omitting such facts. Such a juror might have no intention of fol-
lowing instructions given to the jury by the trial judge.
Don't believe me? The Fully Informed Jury Association has
been involved in litigation because the government has been con-
cerned that jurors will follow information given to them by Asso-
ciation members regarding the "right" of jurors to engage in nulli-
fication of government actions by disregarding court instruc-
tions. 2 If the Fully Informed Jury Association had not only a Web
site, 3 but also cyberspace meetings in which its members will
never be physically linked, it would be extremely difficult for law-
yers to know whether they are selecting jurors who believe in jury
nullification.
My final technical assumption should be greeted as good news
by those who want to protect fair jury trials, but bad news by per-
sons whose primary interests relate to personal privacy. I assume
that it will continue to be as easy as it is now for knowledgeable
formation about cyberspace for the Justice Department. E.g. Margret Johnston, Wiretap
Laws to Be Updated for Internet Age, INFOwoRLD, July 24, 2000, at 16; Cheryl Rosen,
FBI's "Carnivore" Takes Bite out of Privacy, Critics Say, INFO. WK. ONIUNE (July 17, 2000),
at http'I/ www.informationveek.com/795/Fbi.htm. The "poor" CIA is offering grants to help
it catch up with cyber technology: In-Q-Tel Information Technology Fund 2000, at
http:J/www.in-q-tel.com/2-Fund.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2000); see also Paula Shaki Trim-
ble, Gathering IT Intelligence, FED. COMPUTER WM. (June 5, 2000), at http/IVww.fcw.com/
fcw/articles/2000/0605/mgt-inqtel-06-05-00.asp.
12. Fully Informed Jury Ass'n v. San Diego, 78 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished
table decision), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 814 (1996); e.g., Turney v. Alaska, 936 P.2d 533, 540-
41 (Alaska 1997); see also Shayana Boyd, Recent Development, Criminal Law: United
States v. Thomas and Turney v. State: Courts Take Steps to Control Jury Nullification, 22
AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 707, 707-12 (1999); Erick J. Haynie, Populism, Free Speech, and the
Rule of Law: The "Fully Informed" Jury Movement and Its Implications, 88 CRIM. L. &
CRIAINOLOGY 343 (1997).
13. The Association's Web site is: www.fija.org.
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providers of information (what we think of now as Web sites) to
gain information about the computer identities of site visitors and
that there will be at least as many businesses as there are today
that can provide their clients with information regarding the cy-
berspace activities of specific individuals. In other words, it is my
belief (or hope, anyway) that the mousetrap makers will stay one
step ahead of most of the mice.
Today, as I assume everyone knows, when you travel the
Internet or World Wide Web you leave a trail of cyber "foot-
prints." Your computer gives each Web site your internet protocol
or IP address. A Web page needs your IP address in order to send
you the information that appears on the page, and to interact
with your computer. There are ways of shielding your identity,
such as through the use of modems that use random IP ad-
dresses. Indeed, an old-fashioned telephone modem should give
you random IP addresses. However, if you're using an Internet
service provider, your provider knows where you have gone
throughout cyberspace. When you use a Web browser or search
engine, your message to the Web page asking for information may
be revealed to your Internet service provider, which may often be
your employer or school. When you are using a browser to search
the Web, pages that you hit may be able to receive information of
the last page viewed. Everybody knows about "cookies" that are
files the Web site will place on your hard disk when you go to
those sites. Many times cookies just give you an identifier so that
you don't have to go through a laborious sign in process whenever
you hit that Web page in the future. However, cookies can also be
designed to provide a great deal of information concerning you to
the Web page host including some information that will allow
tracking of some of your activities in the World Wide Web. There
is software available to protect privacy on computers and easily
available encryption services that will protect your identity as
well as the content of your messages. 4 There is proposed legisla-
tion in Congress to restrict the use of computer cookies. 5 Never-
theless, it is difficult for me to believe there will be a time when
14. Monique R. Brown, Revenge of the Cookie Monsters, BLACK ENTERPRISE, May
1998, at 42-43 (referencing both free and pay-for anti-cookie software that can be down-
loaded from current Web sites); see, e.g., Hushmail, at http://www.hushmail.com (last vis-
ited Sept. 26, 2000); Junkbusters Links to Other Resources, at http'//wwwv.junkbusters.
comlht/en/links.html (last modified Sept. 14, 2000).
15. Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S. 2606, 106th Cong. (2000).
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you will be able to contact a cyber site without leaving some type
of identification information. Maybe that's just my hope.
If I am guilty of remembering the future, and total privacy ex-
ists for cyber associations in the future, the jury system is
doomed. In such a world, there will be no way for an attorney to
identify whether jurors have engaged in cyber activities that
would demonstrate that they have a bias towards a party in the
litigation or a view about the subject matter of the litigation that
would make it impossible for them to render a fair and impartial
verdict. There will never be perfect knowledge about individual
activities in cyberspace. If, however, some information concerning
cyber activity of the members of the jury pool is available, the at-
torney who possesses such information would have an incredibly
helpful tool in jury selection. The attorney with information about
cyber activities of potential jurors will be able to use jury chal-
lenges for cause, and use preemptive challenges, in a strategically
wise manner. The attorney without that information may be con-
senting to the impaneling of a jury that is biased against his
client.
With these assumptions in mind, I will give my tentative views
regarding free press versus fair trial issues in the next fifty years,
and how the Supreme Court rulings should be modified in order
to resolve those issues.
FMST AMENDMENT VALUES AND STANDARDS
Many scholars have looked to the work of Thomas Emerson for
a summary of the marketplace (democratic) and libertarian (self-
fulfillment) values that are the core of the First Amendment.16
16. THOMAS I. EmERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970). As Profes-
sor Baker has said:
Professor Thomas Emerson, probably America's most thoughtful and influ-
ential [F]irst [A]mendment scholar, finds [Flirst [A]mendment freedom es-
sential for furthering four values: (1) individual self-fulfillment, (2) advance-
ment of knowledge and discovery of truth, (3) participation in decision
making by all members of the society (which is "particularly significant for
political decisions" but 'embraces the right to participate in the building of
the whole culture") and (4) achievement of a "more adaptable and hence sta-
ble community."
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989) (quoting EMERSON,
supra, at 6-7).
Following Emerson's basic four principles does not give one a set of clear answers
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Professor Emerson, in turn, based some of his work on positions
set forth by Justice Brandeis. Early in the last century, Justice
Brandeis was the first to recognize, (at least in the pages of the
United States Reports), the twin values protected by the free
speech clause. 7 Speech was a means to an end, according to
Brandeis, as it was essential to the development of the ideas that
structured our society."' Brandeis also explained that the freedom
of speech was an end in itself, in that the freedom to speak one's
thoughts was essential to the fulfillment of the human spirit. The
person who was forbidden from speaking suffered as much or
more as did society by the loss of his contribution to the market-
place. I am willing to accept the Brandeis-Emerson position and
most of the standards of scholars who might be deemed true
"speech protectors."1 9
Although I do not want this article to read like a treatise or,
worst of all, a law review article, I must mention the First
Amendment standards that have been developed by the Supreme
Court.2 °
First, the Supreme Court has used a strict scrutiny standard,
which requires a government action to be necessary to a compel-
ling interest, if the government action is aimed at the suppression
of an idea or message. The strict scrutiny standard is incredibly
difficult for the government to meet. Statutes attempting to con-
trol hate speech, ban flag burning, or compensate crime victims
have all failed this test.2'
to speech issues. Thus Professor Martin Redish, who also accepts the approach set out in
Emerson's work, arrives at different conclusions than Professor Baker on a number of is-
sues. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30-36, 48-51
(1984); see also Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expres-
sion: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 678-79 (1982); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 618-24 (1982).
17. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
EMERSON, supra note 16, at 106-07 (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring)). See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS
(1997) (examining the development of First Amendment theories prior to the time the
United States Supreme Court took a real interest in First Amendment values).
18. This marketplace value was described in earlier Holmes opinions in which Bran-
deis had joined. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
19. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 16; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN
SOCIETY (1992).
20. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, ch. 16 and SMOLLA, supra note 2, chs. 3-4.
21. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (protecting hate speech);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victim Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123
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At the other end of the spectrum from the strict scrutiny stan-
dard is the standard used for court review of "time, place or man-
ner" regulations that are not content related. To justify a time,
place or manner limitation on expressive activity, the government
need only show that its regulation is narrowly tailored to an im-
portant interest. In practice, this standard might be called an in-
termediate test, to separate it from the rationality test used to
review economic classifications under the equal protection guar-
antee.22 In reality, the standard is merely a reasonableness test.
So long as the government action is not designed to suppress ex-
pression, a content-neutral regulation that is reasonably designed
to promote any legitimate interest of government will likely sur-
vive.23 Any reasonable argument will save such laws. Even the
preservation of the aesthetic quality of Los Angeles was used to
uphold a content neutral regulation of speech. Talk about an
easy test! Who knew that Los Angeles had any aesthetic quality?
The Court has used a reasonableness test when it has exam-
ined regulations of the content of speech in a non-public forum,
which is a place or channel of communication that is owned by
the government and that has not been thrown open for public dis-
course (such as a high school class or courtroom, when class or a
court is in session). So long as the regulation is not designed to
suppress a viewpoint, a content-based regulation of speech in a
non-public forum will be upheld if it is arguably reasonable.25
In between the "strict scrutiny" and a reasonableness test is
the standard used to examine content-neutral court orders re-
stricting speech. The Supreme Court requires that the judicial
order be narrowly tailored to promote a truly important govern-
ment interest.26 The test that has been developed over the past
(1991) (concluding that a victim compensation statute funded by seizing money from
criminals who make money publishing reports of their crimes is unconstitutional); Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (protecting flag burning).
22. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, §§ 10.7, 14.3, 16.47, 16.48.
23. Id. §§ 16.47 to 16.49; SNOLLA, supra note 2, at §§ 8:39 to 8:50, ch. 9.
24. City Council of L.A._ v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984).
25. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.47(c); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading
Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication,
70 VA. L. REv. 1219 (1984).
26. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 790 (1994); SMOLLA,
supra note 2, at §§ 13:32, 13:37, 13:38. The strength of the standard may have been weak-
ened by the recent ruling in Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2491 (2000).
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two decades has always seemed to me to be an instance in which
the Court is saying for content-neutral judicial orders restricting
speech that "we're going to use the wording of that old test for
time, place or manner regulations but, damn it, this time we're
really gonna apply the test and require facts rather than just a
reasonable argument by the trial judge or government." This
standard is truly an intermediate standard, for it does not involve
either a heavy presumption for or against the government.
In the remainder of this article, I will give the reader my tenta-
tive views on whether the standards currently employed by the
Supreme Court for the control of litigation related speech will be
adequate for dealing with mid twenty-first century problems. I
sometimes label my views as tentative simply because I want to
"wimp out." This time, my views really are tentative. The degree
to which we will need to change First Amendment standards in
this area depends greatly on the speed and nature of technologi-
cal development concerning information transmission.
RESTRAINING ORDERS TO THIRD PARTIES & COURT ORDERS
PROTECTING TRIAL MATERIALS
For a quarter of a century, we have seen the Supreme Court
develop a First Amendment principle that makes it virtually im-
possible for a trial court to issue an injunction or restraining or-
der that prevents the press from reporting anything that occurred
at an open court session, or anything that is a matter of public re-
cord." And so it should be, both now and in the future.
The reporting of the facts from public records and trials poses a
serious threat to the fairness of trials and to privacy interests of
individuals, particularly victims. That danger will grow greater
as new information technologies develop, because such reports
will go to a far greater number of persons and will last longer
than yesterday's newspaper. In a world of smart engines and
sorters, everyone who has some interest in trials regarding cer-
tain types of crimes (such as crimes involving sexual violence)
will receive all of this information. The smart sorters and search
27. The series of cases starts with Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568
(1976). For a discussion of this line of cases, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.25
and SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 15:27 to 15:40.
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engines used by a high tech "Jerry Springer audience" will elimi-
nate other types of information from cyber sources while collect-
ing all of the data available concerning such crimes.
Despite the harm that can be caused by such speech, the value
of press reporting regarding the trial process is at the core of the
First Amendment. Trial reporting serves what Vincent Blasi
termed the "checking function" of the First Amendment.2' This in-
formation helps the citizenry evaluate the actions of the judicial
branch of government, and other branches of government, in
cases wherein a unit of government is a party to the litigation.
For that reason, trial reporting is core political speech that should
be protected to the greatest extent possible. One of the dangers of
attempting to control damage to litigation by controlling press re-
ports of public records of portions of trials that are open to public
would be the problem with defining "the press." If we were to
have some limited freedom for "the press" to report such matters,
but imposed restraints on other disseminators of information via
cyber systems, the judiciary would have the judiciary defining the
press. Such a definition might inherently favor established press
or media sources that were not unduly harsh on the judiciary and
disfavor new types of information distribution systems where
media sources were particularly critical of the judiciary. The Su-
preme Court has indicated that there are some First Amendment
dangers inherent in governmental attempts to define the press so
as to give less protection to some speakers rather than others,
though it has been unclear on this point.2 9
A variety of Supreme Court cases, in addition to those that di-
rectly involve so-called press gag orders, provide support for a
near ban on judicial orders barring speech about matters of public
record or ongoing litigation. Cases involving the physical activi-
ties of persons near courthouses, or public statutes by third par-
ties about litigation-related issues, have shown increasing Su-
preme Court concern with judicial control of litigation-related
speech. In 1965, in Cox v. Louisiana," all of the Warren Court
28. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AA1. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521; Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment,
85 COLUTi. L. REV. 449 (1985).
29. See SAIOLLA, supra note 2, § 22:19. But cf L.A Police Dep't v. United Reporting
Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
30. 379 U.S. 559 (1965). The majority reversed the conviction of the persons who vio-
lated the law, but the majority opinion assumed that the law itself presented no constitu-
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Justices were willing to accept the constitutionality of a law that
prohibited demonstrations near a courthouse with the intent to
influence proceedings therein. In 1983, in United States v.
Grace,31 the Supreme Court struck down a statute restricting
demonstrations outside of the United States Supreme Court
building itself. According to the Court in Grace, physical activities
near a courthouse could not be banned on the basis of their con-
tent unless the government could demonstrate that the third
party's speech is truly likely to interfere with the judicial process.
What a difference twenty years made!32
In 1962, in Wood v. Georgia,33 the Supreme Court applied the
clear and present danger test to prohibit judges from enjoining
speech of third parties concerning ongoing judicial proceedings
merely because the third parties' speech would appear in the
news media and might be read by persons who might eventually
be part of a grand jury or jury process. Wood was decided before
the Court's use of strict scrutiny to examine context-based pun-
ishment. Since that time the Supreme Court has strengthened
the clear and present danger test34 and used strict scrutiny to re-
view judicial orders preventing press reporting.35 Today, a judicial
order requiring third parties to stop engaging in litigation-related
speech should be subject to the heavy presumption against prior
restraint, and strict judicial review.36 Thus, for example, a judi-
cial order requiring the Fully Informed Jury Association to shut
down its Web site should not be sustained, although an order re-
quiring the association to refrain from giving to jurors trial pam-
phlets advocating that they disregard judicial instructions might
be upheld.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's use of strict scrutiny when
tional problems. Id. at 562-64.
31. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
32. Indeed, the Court now seems to pretend that Cox does not exist. See, e.g., Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (invalidating a statute that banned certain picketing near
embassies that was virtually identical to the statute at issue in Cox while mentioning Cox
in that portion of the opinion).
33. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
34. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam); see also NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.15.
35. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976); see also NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.25; SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 15:27, 15:40.
36. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, §§ 16.25, 16.46; SMOLLA supra note 2, ch.
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reviewing judicial orders preventing speech by third parties, the
Court has been lenient in allowing restrictions on the speech of
parties to the litigation and their attorneys, particularly when
that speech involves information gained through the discovery
process.
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart37 the Supreme Court upheld
an order restricting the use of information gained through pre-
trial discovery in a civil case, even though the party that received
the information was a newspaper. The Court appeared to use a
reasonableness test for the review of orders barring the disclosure
of information gained through discovery. The majority in Seattle
Times simply ruled that a protective order should not be subject
to the presumption against prior restraints, because such pretrial
orders were a necessary adjunct of an open discovery system. The
newspaper could still publish information similar to that which it
received by pretrial discovery, according to the majority, if, but
only if, the newspaper could show that it had received the infor-
mation through means unrelated to the pretrial discovery proc-
ess.
In future decades, the Supreme Court should give greater pow-
ers to the judiciary to impose pretrial restrictions on speed re-
lated to information gained through the discovery process, due to
the fact that dissemination of such information will have a
greater adverse effect on the parties than it would today. For ex-
ample, let us assume that, in a civil trial involving the Coca-Cola
Corporation and the Coca-Cola Bottlers, the formula for Coca-
Cola is disclosed to a party through pretrial discovery. A half-
century ago, disclosure of that information would be damaging,
but Coca-Cola would have been able to control the damage by
finding out the precise scope of the disclosure and monitoring ri-
vals' products for presence of new soft drinks that tasted similar
to Coca-Cola. Today, disclosure of the information through the
Web or Internet would make that information available to every
man, woman, and child who searched for the information before
steps could be taken to stop republication of the formula. In fu-
ture decades, smart search engines and sorters should make it
likely that all persons interested in soft drinks would immedi-
ately have the improperly disclosed information about the Coca-
37. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
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Cola formula, even though they were not personally doing a
search for the information. One doesn't need to be an expert in
economic analysis to realize that millions of persons making their
own "knock-off Coca-Cola" for "home use" would significantly un-
dercut Coca-Cola's sales.
Disclosure of information from pretrial proceedings in criminal
trials can have a devastating impact on victims. For example, let
us assume that the defendant in a rape prosecution has received,
through pretrial discovery, a great amount of information con-
cerning the victim. Disclosure of that information in newspapers,
the broadcast media, the Internet or Web would be bad enough
today. However, newspapers, particularly in big cities, might not
report the details of the case. Persons interested in sex crimes,
with current technology, would have to do a time consuming, and
perhaps unsuccessful, search for the information. In the future,
persons interested in sexual crimes would instantly have infor-
mation regarding the woman who had been attacked. The victim's
name, and details about her life, will be spread quickly through
the cyber systems, and will be captured by smart search engines
and sorters. The information captured by these computer devices
will not disappear the next day, like yesterday's newspaper, in
the garbage.
There should be a two-pronged approach to preventing the
harm caused by disclosure of litigation-related information. First,
the Supreme Court should establish a true rationality test for the
review of trial court orders restricting or prohibiting the disclo-
sure of information gained through a litigation discovery process.
As long as a reasonable argument can be made that disclosure of
information gained through pretrial discovery could cause some
significant harm to any person, or the judicial process, a trial
court should be able to order the attorneys and clients not to dis-
close the information.
Second, statutes should establish absolute civil liability, and
criminal liability based on negligence, for violation of court orders
prohibiting disclosure of information gained through discovery. I
would propose absolute criminal liability for violation of such
crimes but for the fact that due process principles make it diffi-
cult to impose significant criminal sanctions for an activity that is
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not defined in terms of some type of mens rea requirement."
In terms of civil liability, an absolute liability standard is nec-
essary to protect against the devastating harm that can be caused
by dissemination of information through cyber systems. If the
injured party had to prove that the opposing party, who received
the information under a protective order, was responsible for the
information being posted on the Web, recovery would be impossi-
ble in many cases where the opposing party, in fact, had disclosed
the information. The identification of persons who initially post
the information on the Web is difficult, as demonstrated by recent
searches for persons who have shut down major Web sites
through mass hits, or who have created viruses that infect e-mail
systems. It may be easy to track each person's e-mail, or the visi-
tors to the Web site, but it is often difficult to find out how infor-
mation was initially put into cyber systems. 9
An absolute liability system would simply shift risk from the
party who had to disclose information because of the discovery
process to the persons who received information. The party re-
ceiving the information is in the same position as the businesses
which have usually been subject to strict liability. For example, a
jurisdiction might make all building demolition companies subject
to strict liability, because persons who enter the business should
know that, even though they are perfectly careful, they may cause
significant harm to others. Similarly, the party that asks for in-
formation that is subject to a protective order knows that disclo-
sure of the information will cause substantial harm to the other
party.
The only issue in a case based on violation of a protective order
should be the amount of money that should be awarded the in-
jured party. While I would establish absolute liability for parties
who disclosed the information, I would require the party whose
information was disclosed to the public to prove that real harm
resulted from the disclosure. The party who receives the informa-
tion should only be responsible for harm that actually occurred.
Statutes imposing criminal sanctions for violation of protective
38. For a discussion of the due process principles and the mens rea requirement, see
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw § 3.8 (3d ed. 2000).
39. It is getting easier, however, to catch such persons. See Stuart McClure & Joel
Scambray, Security Watch: "Honey Pot" Network Can Gather Evidence for Catching and
Prosecuting Hackers, INFOWORLD, Aug. 7, 2000, at 52.
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orders are necessary for two reasons. First, a party who is "judg-
ment-proof," because he has no money, otherwise would be free to
cause harm to the other party by disclosing the information in
violation of a discovery order. Second, particularly in criminal
cases, disclosure of the information may result in severe harm
that is hard to quantify in monetary terms, and impossible to
remedy. In our rape case example, the defendant might well be
willing to sacrifice any monetary resources he has to see the
prosecution dropped, or to receive some benefit in the plea bar-
gaining process. If detail regarding the victim and her life are put
into cyber systems, the woman has been victimized again. The
harm done to the victim from disclosure of information may be so
great as to virtually destroy her life. The woman in this situation
may well decide to end the continuing damage to her by refusing
to testify at trial. If so, the prosecution may be dropped, or the
rapist may receive a favorable plea bargain.
The Supreme Court in Seattle Times was not concerned with
New York Times v. Sullivan0 and its progeny, which protect
false, defamatory speech under some circumstances. Similarly, I
am not concerned that the protection of information gained
through the discovery process will somehow undercut the mar-
ketplace value inherent in the First Amendment. The societal in-
terest in protecting the rights of the parties to the litigation sys-
tem, and in the operation of a truly open pretrial discovery
system, outweigh any First Amendment cost caused by the re-
striction on speech of parties to the litigation, at least when the
injured party is not a public official.
I am not certain whether the Court should create different li-
ability standards for disclosure of information received in the dis-
covery process that relates to "an issue of public concern" as op-
posed to information that relates only to a "private issue."
Perhaps, the Supreme Court should establish a negligence stan-
dard for the disclosure of information concerning issues of public
concern.41 In other words, if the disclosed information related to
an issue of public concern, the injured party would have to prove
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a discussion of Group Libel Laws, the holding in N.Y.
Times, and libel of public and private individuals, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2,
§§ 16.32 to 16.35 and SMOLLA, supra note 2, ch. 15, §§ 23:1 to 23:6.
41. See generally Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985). See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.35; SMOLLA, supra note 2, ch. 23;
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION (1986, with annual supplements).
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that the opposing party was negligent in how they "protected" the
information, in order to receive monetary compensation for their
injuries. A strict liability standard might deter persons from re-
questing information about an issue of public concern (particu-
larly from the government).
CLOSURE OF PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has restricted
the ability of judges to close trial proceedings with a standard of
review virtually as strict as that used in the gag order cases. At
first, in a fragmented decision and a plurality opinion, the Court
indicated that a trial judge should close portions on findings of a
need to protect "an overriding interest."42 Later, a majority of the
Justices favored a compelling interest standard for the review of
trial court closure orders. Prior to 1980, the Court indicated that
a hearing regarding the suppression of evidence in a criminal
case could be closed when the defendant and prosecution agreed
to the closure and the order was observed to protect the fairness
of the trial itself.' The strictness of the narrowly tailored to serve
the compelling interest standard is clarified by the fact that the
Court has not upheld any closure order since 1980.
41
American Bar Association's Standard for Criminal Justice 8-
3.246 adequately summarizes the current position of the Supreme
42. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
43. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
44. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979).
45. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § 20.25; SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 25:1 to
25:12.
46. STANDARDS FOR CRIINAL JUSTICE Standard 8-3.2 (3d ed. 1991). The text of Stan-
dard 8-3.2 (Public access to judicial proceedings and related documents and exhibits) pro-
vides:
(a) In any criminal case, all judicial proceedings and related documents and
exhibits, and any record made thereof, not otherwise required to remain con-
fidential, should be accessible to the public, except as provided in section (b).
(b)(1) A court may issue a closure order to deny access to the public to speci-
fied portions of a judicial proceeding or related document or exhibit only after
reasonable notice of and an opportunity to be heard on such proposed order
has been provided to the parties and the public and the court thereafter en-
ters findings that:
(A) unrestricted access would pose a substantial probability of harm to the
fairness of the trial or other overriding interest which substantially out-
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Court test by stating that a court may order closure of portions of
a trial-related proceeding if: (1) "Unrestricted access would pose a
substantial probability of harm to the fairness of the trial or other
overriding interest which substantially outweighs the defendant's
right to a public trial," (2) the closure would prevent the harm,
and (3) "there is no less restrictive alternative reasonably avail-
able."
Some "nit-pickers" may claim that the Court's compelling in-
weighs the defendant's right to a public trial;
(B) the proposed order will effectively prevent the aforesaid harm; and
(C) there is no less restrictive alternative reasonably available to prevent the
aforesaid harm.
(2) A proceeding to determine whether a closure order should issue may itself
be closed only upon a prima facie showing of the findings required by Section
b(1). In making the determination as to whether such a prima facie showing
exists, the court should not require public disclosure of or access to the matter
which is the subject of the closure proceeding itself and the court should ac-
cept submissions under seal, in camera or in any other manner designed to
permit a party to make a prima facie showing without public disclosure of
said matter.
(c) While a court may impose reasonable time, place and manner limitations
on public access, such limitations should not operate as the functional
equivalent of a closure order.
(d) For purposes of this Standard, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) "criminal case" shall include the period beginning with the filing of an ac-
cusatory instrument against an accused and all appellate and collateral pro-
ceedings:
(2) "judicial proceeding" shall include all legal events that involve the exercise
of judicial authority and materially affect the substantive or procedural in-
terests of the parties, including courtroom proceedings, applications, motions,
plea-acceptances, correspondence, arguments, hearings, trials and similar
matters, but shall not include bench conferences or conferences on matters
customarily conducted in chambers;
(3) "related documents and exhibits" shall include all writings, reports and
objects, to which both sides have access, relevant to any judicial proceeding in
the case which are made a matter of record in the proceeding;
(4) "public" shall include private individuals as well as representatives of the
news media;
(5) "access" shall mean the most direct and immediate opportunity as is rea-
sonably available to observe and examine for purposes of gathering and dis-
seminating information;
(6) "closure order" shall mean any judicial order which denies public access.
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terest test may be more strict than the ABA standard. However, I
doubt that the adjective describing the word "interest" really
changes the test. If we require that there be facts on the record
demonstrating that there truly are no other means of protecting a
compelling or overriding interest, we have created an insur-
mountable burden for trial judges to meet. When the Court ruled
that trial judges could not close voir dire proceedings unless there
was specific evidence that the closure order was "essential to pre-
serve higher values and narrowly tailored to serve that interest"
47
the Court effectively prevented closure of such proceedings.
The strictness of the Court's current standard is exemplified by
Globe Newspaper, Co. v. Superior Court,' in which the Court in-
validated a state statute requiring trial judges to exclude the
press, and general public, from courtroom proceedings during the
testimony of victims in certain types of criminal sexual offense
cases. Though the Justices left open the theoretical possibility
that there might sometimes be a valid closure order, the majority
opinion ruled that a trial judge would have to make specific find-
ings as to how closure of the proceeding was narrowly tailored to
protect a child victim of a crime from further trauma. Supreme
audacity from the Supreme Court! Absent a combination of psy-
chiatric training and an ability to see into the future, it would
seem impossible for a trial judge to make specific findings that
would meet the Supreme Court standard. I hope that trial judges
are disregarding their oaths of office,49 by disregarding the stan-
dard imposed by the Court in Globe Newspaper. Otherwise, no
victim of a sexual assault case can be protected.
The continued use of strict scrutiny for reviewing trial closure
orders will be nothing less than a societal disaster if even one or
two of my predictions regarding technological change are accu-
rate. In the future, without wasting a lot of time "surfing the
Web," persons interested in crime will be receiving information
regarding details of pretrial hearings and motion dispositions in a
wide variety of criminal cases that in years past might not have
been deemed worthy of newspaper coverage. The information re-
47. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
48. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
49. The oath of federal and state judges to follow the Constitution, required by Article
I or Article VI, includes following the rulings of the United States Supreme Court. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, VI. For an examination of this point, see Daniel A. Farber, The Su-
preme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
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garding such cases will be collected from cyber sources by all
those persons with an appetite for crime news. The damage done
to victims of certain types of crimes, particularly children or other
persons who have been victims of sexual violence, will be magni-
fied by disclosure of this information through cyber systems. Vic-
tim names and the details of the crimes committed against them
will be collected by the computers of persons with a taste for sala-
cious information. Avoiding the damage done to the lives of these
victims will be impossible if pretrial or trial proceedings must be
left open in the future.
If jury selection processes are to be open to the "cyber press,"
anyone who has not led a perfect life will not want to be a mem-
ber of a jury pool. All of the information a potential jury discloses
during voir dire might be sent out to the world through cyber sys-
tems. Current "Court TV" and other cable or broadcast networks
may send out such information, but information sent out through
a television channel is difficult to gather and retain. Cyber sys-
tems, when combined with smart searchers and sorters, will al-
low all those interested in trials, particularly criminal trials, to
collect the information about jurors easily, and to use the infor-
mation as they choose.
The Supreme Court should adopt a standard that would allow
closure of portions of a trial, or pretrial proceedings, whenever
the trial judge could reasonably conclude that closure would pro-
tect the fairness of the trial, or the privacy interests of witnesses,
victims, or jurors, while still allowing the public to receive infor-
mation about issues of public concern that were involved in the
trial process. So long as a trial judge was allowing information
about the nature of the crime, and an edited version of the pro-
ceedings, to become public, a closure order that arguably is de-
signed to protect fair trial or privacy interests should be upheld.5"
My proposed test might result in the closure of virtually all
pretrial suppression hearings. In cyber world there will always be
the possibility that information about evidence that was sup-
pressed would be received by a wide variety of persons who might
appear in the jury pool through cyber systems. Nevertheless,
First Amendment marketplace values can be protected so long as
reports and records of the pretrial proceedings are made available
50. The case law is to the contrary. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 25:7, 25:8.
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to the public, including the press, once a jury is sequestered. Of
course, there would always be the possibility that the information
that was made available at that time might harm the fairness of
a future trial if the defendant was re-tried for the crime due to
some error in the original proceeding. No system, especially one
suggested by me, will be perfect.
If the Supreme Court properly balanced First Amendment and
privacy values it would overrule Globe Newspaper before the age
of smart searchers and sorters is upon us. Court rules or statutes
prohibiting the disclosure of names of victims of certain crimes
(particularly child victims) to the press should be upheld.5' Trial
court orders closing portions of the trial in which the victim testi-
fies should not be open to the public. Similarly, the Court should
overrule any Sixth Amendment ruling that requires the defen-
dant to have every aspect of the trial, including the portion of the
trial in which the victim testimony is given, be presented in pub-
lic.52
In the public access cases, to date, the Court has engaged in a
form of balancing. Under the Court's current balancing test, First
Amendment and Sixth Amendment public trial values always
override privacy values. That balance may be acceptable for the
moment. Nevertheless, victims' names or the background of spe-
cific jurors adds little to the discussion of public issues. The in-
creased harms from disclosure of such information in an era of
smart search engines and sorters should outweigh the marginal
value that details regarding witnesses, victims, or jurors might
add to public discourse.53
51. If the news media gets this information from public records, or through other law-
ful means, the reporting of the information should not be punishable for reasons I have
earlier discussed. Thus, Florida Star, Inc. v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that
"where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, pun-
ishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest
of the highest order .... .") would not be overruled under my proposals. For an in-depth
discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of these issues, see SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§
15:33, 16:20, 22:14, 24:5, 25:11, 25:43, 25:45.
52. The standard for rejecting a defendant's Sixth Amendment request that a portion
of the trial proceedings be open to the press and public mirrors the First Amendment
standard for closure orders. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44-47 (1984).
53. For an excellent analysis of the real pros and cons of restricting litigation-related
speech, see David A. Strauss, Why It's Not Free Speech Versus Fair Trial, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 109 (1998).
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LAWYERS' SPEECH & THE DISCOVERY OF POTENTIAL JURORS'
CYBER ACTIVITIES
54
Even if all of my technical assumptions about the future are
accurate, American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.5, 3.6, and 3.8 are capable of protecting First Amend-
ment and due process values in the future so long as drafting
committees, courts, and legislatures revise their jurisdictions'
version of these rules as information exchange technology pro-
gresses. My proposals in this area involve some "tinkering" with
the Model Rules, but my focus will primarily be on the collection
and disclosure of information regarding the cyber activities of po-
tential jurors. This will have more to do with the collection and
disclosure of information held by attorneys and their clients.
Court rules, and statutes, regarding discovery of information
held by a party in a civil or criminal trial regarding persons need
to be kept in mind when looking at Model Rules 3.5, 3.6, and 3.8.
I assume that the leading (or, at least, most cited) treatise on
criminal procedure is correct in stating that: (1) most courts will
not allow discovery by the government or the defendant, in a
criminal case, of information regarding persons in the jury pool;
(2) the government might be required to make a disclosure of in-
formation regarding potential jurors in rare circumstances where
the withholding of the information would create a truly unfair
trial.55
Rule 3.5,6 "Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal," pro-
hibits ex-parte communication with jurors or prospective jurors or
54. Anyone interested in the meaning of the American Bar Association Annotated
Model Rules of Professional Conduct should consult RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS:
THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2000).
55. WAYNE LAFAVE, JEROLD ISRAEL & NANCY KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(a)
(3d ed. 2000). For information regarding the frequency of citations to this treatise, at least
in law reviews, see Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Legal Books Published Since 1978, 29
J. LEGAL STUDIES 397, 404 (2000).
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (1998). Rule 3.5 (Impartiality and Deco-
rum of the Tribunal) provides:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by
means prohibited by law;
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by
law; or
(c) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
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conduct engaged to disrupt a trial or tribunal process. As the
commentary to the Rule indicates, the lawyer is responsible for a
client's contacting a juror or a person known to be a member of
the jury pool if the lawyer assisted the client. This Rule governs,
in part, the investigation of potential jurors by lawyers, clients, or
their agents once the potential name of a juror is known.
Rule 3.6," "Trial Publicity," governs "extrajudicial statement[s]
that [the lawyers should] expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication." Such statements are prohibited if the
lawyer should know that such statements "will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."
The rule provides a variety of exceptions, including an ability of a
lawyer to respond to statements made in public that are adverse
to his client.
57. Id. R. 3.6. Rule 3.6 states:
(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or
litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a rea-
sonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communi-
cation if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the
matter.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited
by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(2) information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information nec-
essary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved,
when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of sub-
stantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the
accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information neces-
sary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agen-
cies and the length of the investigation.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a
reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the sub-
stantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer
or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be
limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse
publicity.
(d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer sub-
ject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).
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Rule 3.8,58 the "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor," goes
farther than Rule 3.6 and states that prosecutors must "refrain
from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused," ex-
cept for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the
nature of the prosecutor's actions or that serve legitimate law en-
forcement purposes. Additionally, Rule 3.8 requires the prosecu-
tor to take "reasonable care" from having investigators or other
law enforcement personnel or staff associated with the prosecutor
"in a criminal case" make a statement that would violate Rule 3.6
if made by a lawyer or prosecutor.
As soon as possible, in every jurisdiction, judicial rules commit-
tees and legislatures should clarify guidelines regarding the ap-
plicability of court rules, or statutes, similar to Model Rules 3.5,
3.6, and 3.8 to Web sites and e-mail systems. After a jurisdiction
58. Id. R. 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor). Rule 3.8 directs that the
prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not sup-
ported by probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the
right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reason-
able opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important
pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or miti-
gates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense
and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a
protective order of the tribunal;
(e) exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement per-
sonnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecu-
tor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prose-
cutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6;
(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to pre-
sent evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably
believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any ap-
plicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an
ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.
(g) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature
and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforce-
ment purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a sub-
stantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.
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makes Rules 3.5 and 3.6 applicable to e-mails and Web sites,
these rules should be clarified on a case-by-case basis. Every state
supreme court, and the Federal Judicial Conference, should es-
tablish a system for periodic consideration of how rules governing
the cyberspace activities of attorneys should be modified so as to
protect both free speech values and fair trials. The National Cen-
ter for State Courts might provide a vehicle through which state
courts could receive information concerning the technological
changes that will have an impact on the fair trial-free press
problems that are addressed by Model Rules 3.5, 3.6, and 3.8.
Under current Supreme Court decisions, attorneys may engage
in mass, or targeted, mail.59 For reasons mentioned earlier in this
article, mass e-mails by attorneys may not pose much danger to
the judicial process today. Today's e-mail systems include a lot of
junk e-mail that is immediately discarded. Greater danger will
come from cyber communications when we enter the age of smart
search engines and smart sorters. In an era of smart searchers
and sorters, attorneys may be more likely to use e-mail or Web
sites to disclose information about parties, victims, or witnesses
in an effort to gain an advantage by harming the credibility and
reputations of these persons.6"
In trials for which juries are not sequestered, a trial judge
should be able to order the monitoring of all information trans-
missions to the general public of parties to litigation to ensure
that information is not being indirectly sent to sources that are
jurors. Serious consideration should be given to banning mass e-
mailing or targeted e-mailing by attorneys. If a jurisdiction does
not want to enact such a ban, or if a ban is invalidated as a viola-
tion of the First Amendment, the jurisdiction should require all
attorneys (including government attorneys) to keep records of the
types of e-mail they have sent out and the e-mail address lists
used.
Attorney Web pages present a problem because of the ability of
Web sites to acquire information concerning persons who visit the
59. Compare Shapiro v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 471 (1988) (striking down a total
ban on targeted mailings by attorneys), with Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
620 (1995) (upholding a thirty-day restriction on targeted mail by attorneys to accident
victims or their relatives).
60. There are attorneys who use such tactics today, without using cyber messages. See
Debra Baker, Shredding the Truth, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1999, at 41.
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site. Attorneys should be prohibited from placing cookies in the
computers of persons who visit their Web site, even if such a
practice would be lawful for non-attorney Web sites. Neverthe-
less, it may be difficult to prevent attorneys from acquiring in-
formation about their Web site visitors, even if attorneys are
banned from using cookies.
Statutes or court rules should be adopted at the state and fed-
eral level requiring any party to a litigation to provide to the op-
posing party all information in the party's possession regarding
cyber activities of potential jurors or witnesses. Such rules will
prevent attorneys from hiding behind their clients. These rules
and statutes also should apply to information about cyber activi-
ties gained by the employment of persons or services that track
individual activity in cyberspace. If only one party to the litiga-
tion had information concerning cyber activities of potential ju-
rors or witnesses the trial could not be a fair one. The advantage
held by the party with that information, once almost all persons
are using cyber systems, would be so great that the opposing
party, in either a civil or criminal trial, would have little chance
of adequately preparing for trial, or participating in a meaningful
manner in the voir dire process.
Special rules should be adopted for governing the cyber activi-
ties of all government agencies, as well as government attorneys.
In any case, civil or criminal, the government (local, state, or fed-
eral) should be required to disclose all information in the gov-
ernment's files regarding the cyber activities of any potential ju-
ror or witness, including the defendant (or the opposing party in a
civil case). The government attorneys and agencies would also be
restricted in their acquisition of data by the Fourth Amendment,
as would a private attorney or client who worked with the gov-
ernment in a manner that gave the attorney or client "state ac-
tion."61 Even if computer privacy legislation were passed, gov-
ernment agencies would be able to acquire information regarding
cyber activities of persons if they applied for a search warrant
akin to that used to tap telephones.62
61. See NOWAK AND ROTUNDA, supra note 2, ch. 12.
62. A study done by USA Today showed a dramatic increase in the number of applica-
tions for search warrants that would allow law enforcement officials to monitor activity on
the Internet. Will Rodger, Warrants for Online Data Soar, USA TODAY, July 28, 2000, at
Al, col. 2. Margret Johnston, Wiretap Laws Need to Be Updated for Internet Age,
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Statutes will need to be enacted to require the police and other
government agencies to comply with this requirement, assuming
that statutes are not enacted at the federal or state level to pro-
hibit the generalized acquisition of information concerning Web
site visitors or Internet activities. Courts cannot control the ac-
tions of police other than through the indirect, and inefficient,
manner of making the prosecutor responsible for the actions of
the police. A prosecutor may not have control over police state-
ments concerning an individual case, if the police are not part of
the same governmental unit as the prosecutor.
CONCLUSION: THE (PERHAPS) UNACCEPTABLE COSTS OF
TRACKING THE CYBER ACTIVITY OF POTENTIAL JURORS
Finding persons willing to be jurors may be more difficult than
it is today if my proposals were followed. In order to increase the
jury pool, by lessening the number of persons in the population
who will seek to avoid jury service, some jurisdictions make jury
service easy by having jurors report for only one day unless they
are called for a trial. For similar reasons, at the present time, po-
tential jurors often are required to fill out only the most basic
questionnaires, such as those suggested by the American Bar As-
sociation.
Unfortunately, the changes in information technology should
make it impossible to have jury service be easy, in terms of bur-
dens on a person's time, or costless, in terms of intrusions into
each juror's privacy. The issue of whether we should compel ju-
rors to submit information that will allow disclosure of their pre-
vious cyber activities will be one of the most difficult issues faced
by courts later this century.
At the present time, if a member of some "militia" group, or a
member of a racial minority, was a party to litigation, and he
could afford to pay for a private investigator, he could receive a
great deal of information about persons who are in the jury pool.
Private investigators, or the government (if the government
chooses to make such an investigation in a case in which it is a
party), should be able to learn whether a potential juror would be
INFOWORLD, July 24,2000, at 16.
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biased for, or against, one of the parties.63 Even without hiring
private investigators, the militia member or racial minority per-
son may be able to use the basic jury questionnaire, and voir dire,
to identify potential jurors whose activities would indicate a bias
against him. As mentioned at the start of this article, jurors today
should feel some apprehension if they consider lying under oath
about their activities or organizational memberships. Subscrip-
tion lists and membership activities, in the physical world, are
not hard to trace.
For example, the militia member might find that a potential
member of the jury has been going to meetings of the Fully In-
formed Jury Association and hope that the juror will be likely to
disregard judicial instructions in order to grant the defendant
"justice." The militia member may want to dismiss a potential ju-
ror because he has learned the person is a member of several civil
rights organizations and a subscriber to "liberal" publications. Or
a racial minority member who was a party to litigation may want
to dismiss a potential juror who has attended meetings of the Ku
Klux Klan, or the now infamous church created by Mr. Hale, a
one-time law student in Illinois (though he was not a student at
the University of Illinois College of Law).
As I have mentioned earlier, in the cyber age, a biased would-
be juror may feel confident that a lie about his cyber activities
will go undiscovered. To take away the convenient lie, and elimi-
nate the probability of prejudiced juries, we will need to ask ju-
rors to provide information regarding the computer system they
use for getting information from cyberspace systems, and any
form of encryption their computer uses to make their activities in
cyber systems anonymous. With that information, the govern-
ment, in criminal cases, might create a complete profile of each
juror's activities in cyber systems. The government should then
be required to turn the information over to the defendant.
In a civil trial, the potential jurors should be required to pro-
vide their computer system information to plaintiffs and defen-
dants. Then, each party could, if he so chose, do a search for the
potential juror's cyber activities. However, a party who conducted
63. Rule 4.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is relevant to the use of inves-
tigations of potential jurors. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (1998).
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such a search should be required to disclose all such information
to the other parties in the case.
My juror tracking proposal would ensure truly fair, neutral ju-
ries with little economic cost. There will not be a significant delay
in jury selection if courts adopt my proposal. Many of the func-
tions of the supercomputer today will be done by a desktop com-
puter at mid-century. A defendant, or opposing party in a civil
case, might receive this information concerning potential jurors'
cyber activities only a day before jury selection. In the future, the
computer for the attorney receiving information would easily be
able to identify juror cyber activities that might indicate a bias
against the attorney's client in minutes or hours, at most.
The societal cost of my juror tracking proposals, in terms of in-
roads on personal privacy and First Amendment values, may be
greater than our society should be willing to pay. As I mentioned
earlier in this article, if a system of full pretrial cyber discovery is
in place, any person who is called for a jury would have his whole
life exposed to the government, or to all parties in a civil litiga-
tion. We might seek to protect such persons with gag orders to
the parties, such as I have endorsed previously, to try to minimize
the damage that might be done to individuals. Nevertheless, the
thought that one's entire life will be open to the government and
public through jury service certainly may well deter most people
from wanting to serve on a jury.
My proposals, if adopted, will do real damage to First Amend-
ment freedom of association values. In a world where everyone
who may be called for jury duty knows that all of his cyber infor-
mation (including associational activities and messages to politi-
cal or religious groups) would be disclosed, people will be more
hesitant than ever when it comes to joining any unpopular or-
ganization. Indeed, organizations that advocate unpopular views
(whether conservative, liberal, or otherwise) may find it difficult
to attract any members at all in such a system. At the close of the
twentieth century, if a person or organization could show that
disclosure of membership in an association would impose a sig-
nificant burden on individual freedoms to join an unpopular or-
ganization, the government would have to show that its request
for information was narrowly tailored to promote a compelling so-
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cietal interest.6 4 In the future courts could find that my cyber in-
formation disclosure system meets this test despite its damage to
the freedom of association. Though there would be a real cost in
terms of deterring membership in unpopular associations, track-
ing the cyber activities of potential jurors could be deemed to be a
narrowly tailored means of producing juries that are as unbiased
as possible.
There are a variety of alternatives to the two polar choices of
requiring jurors to forego all privacy and having juries that we
cannot trust. For example, statutes might allow for the investiga-
tion of cyber activities of persons in the jury pool only if the party
requesting the investigation can demonstrate that there is a high
probability that a segment of the public is biased against him.
Thus, cyber investigations might not be allowed in a normal tort
case involving two "flying cars." An investigation might be re-
quired when one of the pilot drivers was a member of an un-
popular religious or racial group.
It may well be that none of the ideas set forth in this article re-
garding orders prohibiting the dissemination of information, clo-
sure of trials, discovery of cyber activities of jurors or witnesses,
or anything else may make good sense for our society. The First
Amendment and privacy costs of ensuring fair trials may be too
great for us to pay.65
The one thing of which I am certain is that courts and legisla-
tures must not take a wait-and-see approach to problems of rec-
onciling First Amendment and fair trial values in the new infor-
mation age. Groups such as the American Bar Association, the
National Center for State Courts, and the United States Supreme
Court Committees on Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure
should begin now to deal with how new information technologies
may affect the trial process, and the privacy interests of jurors,
victims, and witnesses. If such groups do not do so, our society
64. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.52(c).
65. Professor Gey has argued persuasively that the Internet and Web should be con-
sidered public fora for First Amendment analysis. Steve G. Gey, Reopening the Public Fo-
rum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535 (1998). Although I agree with
Professor Gey on this point, I do not think it affects the analysis in this article. With Pro-
fessor Daniel Farber, I have advocated rejection of a formal forum approach to analyzing
First Amendment issues. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 25.
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will face a "lag-time" full of unfair trials, and unnecessary harm
to victims and witnesses, when cyber information systems domi-
nate the "marketplace of ideas."

